

DEF 12-5 IRAN XR DEF 19-8 US-IRAN

#### Department of State

TELEGRAM



716

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 01164 251020Z

19-L ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 PM-06 NSC-10 SS-14 RSC-01 SA-03 CTAE-00 INR-06

NSAE-00 MC-02 EUR-20 RSR-01 L-03 E-11 AID-20 IGA-02

/111 W

947824

R 250930Z FEB 72 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC: 7861 INFO SECDEF EUCOM CSAF

TEHRAN 1164

SUBJECT: ACCELERATION OF F-4ES FOR IRAN

My 12-53-14 /9-8 W. Jran

REF: TEHRAN 1091: TEHRAN 263: MOSCOW 1603

COUNTRY TEAM MESSAGE

BEGIN SUMMARY

GENERAL AZIMI, MINISTER OF WAR, ON INSTRUCTION OF SHAH ASKS

THAT WE TAKE ANOTHER HARD LOOK AT F-4E PRODUCTION LINE IN

ORDER ACCELERATE DELIVERY OF ONE SQUADRON OF F-4ES TO IRAN

IN 1972. REQUEST REFLECTS SHAH'S INCREASING CONCERN OVER

SOVIET AMBITIONS IN AREA AND ESPECIALLY THREAT SHAH SEES TO

IRAN OF FRIENDSHIP TREATY UNDER CONSIDERATION BY IRAQ AND USSR.

SHAH RECOGNIZES PROBLEMS THIS POSES FOR US BUT IS TURNING TO

USG WITH THIS REQUEST TO GIVE IRAN HIGHER PRIORITY ON FAF4E

PRODUCTION SCHEDULE BECAUSE HE REGARDS US AS MOST DEPENDABLE


FRIEND. END SUMMARY

ACTION REQUESTED: COUNTRY TEAM RECOMMENDS: US: REVIEW F-4E: PRODUCTION LINE AND RESPOND FAVORABLY TO SHAH'S REQUEST FOR 16 F-4ES IN 1972 FROM WHATEVER SOURCE MAY BE AVAILABLE.

1. ON FEB 24 CHARGE WAS CONVOKED BY MINSTER OF WAR, GEN.
REZANUZIMI, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM SHAH. AZIMI SAID SHAH MOST



Jehan 1164 42872



TATES OF

#### Department of State

### **TELEGRAM**

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 01164 251020Z

DEEPLY CONCERNED AT TRENDS IN SECURITY SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST, AND EXPECIALLY ON HIS WESTERN BORDERS. US OFFICIALS ALREADY AWARE OF SHAH'S CONCERN THROUGH DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND OTHER GOI OFFICIALS (SEE REFTELS), BUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ SOVIET RELATIONS INCLUDING AGREEMENT TO DELIVER MORE MIGS AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT PLUS INDICATION THAT RECENT IRAQI-SOVIET TALKS IN MOSCOW INCLUDED CONSIDERATION OF FRIENDSHIP TREATY AS WELL AS INCREASED MILITARY COOPERATION INJECT NEW SENSE OF URGENCY IN SHAH'S TIMETABLE FOR MODERNINIZING AND STRENTHENING HIS ARMED FORCES. MOST SPECIFICALLY, SITUATION REQUIRED IRAN ACCELERATE ITS MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND MOST PARTICULARLY DELIVERY OF F-4E AIRCRAFT.

AZIMI RECALLED THAT GOI HAD REQUESTED DELIVERY OF 16 OF F-4E AIRCRAFT NOW ON ORDER BY IRAN (FIRST OF WHICH WAS NOT SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY UNTIL AUGUST 1973) BE ADVANCED TO CY 1972. HOW-EVER, GOI HAD RECENTLY BEEN INFORMED BY USB AND MCDONNELL#DOUGLAS. THAT PRODUCTION LINE FOR IRAN COULD NOT RPT NOT BE ADVANCED TO MEET 1972 DELIVERY DATES DESIRED. SHAH WAS MOST DISTURBED, AS ADDITION OF F-4ES IN 1972 WAS VITAL TO IRAN'S SECURITY AT THIS TIME. SHAH HAD DIRECTED THAT USB BE ASKED, IF PRODUCTION FOR IRAN COULD NOT IN FACT BE ADVANCED, TO MAKE REQUESTED F-4ES AVAILABLE FROM OTHER SOURCES. SHAH'S DESIRE IS FOR DELIVERY OF F-4ES IN LOTS OF FOUR DURING JUNE TO DECEMBER TIME-FRAME.

3. CHARGE REVIEWED RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN US-IRAN MILITARY COOPERATION, INCLUDING EQUIPMENT AND CREDIT, AND STRESSED THAT RECORD INDICATED WE UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED SHAH'S CONCERNS AND DESIRES AND HAD BEEN EXCEPTIONALLY RESPONSIVE TO SHAH'S WISHES. CURRENTLY, AZIMI'S DEPUTY GENE TOUFANS, WAS: IN: US:


DISCUSSING VERY QUESTION OF ACCLERATED EQUIPMENT ACQUISTION

INCLUDING F-4E.

ACCELERATION OF F-4E DELIVERY RAISED DIFFICULT
TECHNICAL AND COST PROBLEMS AS WELL AS QUESTIONS OF OTHER COMMITMENTS AND PRIORITIES. UNDOUBTEDLY THESE ISSUES WERE BEING
DISCUSSED IN FULL WITH GEN. TOUFANIAN TO ENSURE THAT HE WAS COM-

PLETELY INFORMED OF ROSSIBILITIES AND PROBLEMS AND REASONS FOR ANY LIMITATIONS ON MEETING GOI REQUEST THAT MIGHT EXIST GEN.

TOUFANIAN PROBABLY WOULD HAVE FULLER PICTURES OF SITUATION THANS



#### Department of State

## TELEGRAM

PAGE Ø3 TEHRAN Ø1164 251Ø20Z

WE NOW HAD IN IRAN+

4. AZIMI RESPONDED THAT GOI WAS BEING KEPT INFORMED OF TOUFAND IAN DISCUSSIONS, BUT DECISONON FOR COULD NOT BE DELAYED.


AZIMI MADE CLEAR SHAH FELT ACQUISITION OF 16 FOR A ARCRAFT IN 1972 WAS MOST IMPORTANT IMMEDIATE MILITARY PROBLEM OUTSTANDING. HE STRESSED SHAH BELIEVED THAT NUMBER REQUIRED WAS SMALL IN RELATION TO US INVENTORY, AND THAT UNSETTLED SITUATION CONFRONTING IRAN WARRANTED ACCELERATED DELIVERY TO IRAN AS AGAINST OTHER POSSIBLE DISPOSITIONS (AS TO EUROPE OR EVEN USAF) IN SAME TIME: FRAME.

CHARGE NOTED WE WOULD TRANSMIT SHAH'S REQUEST TO WASHINGTON AND THAT USG, IN SPIRIT OF CLOSE FRIENDSHIP WHICH MARKED
OUR RELATIONS WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO BE RESPONSIVE.
CHARGE SAID THIS SAME FRIENDSHIP REQUIRED HIM TO SAY, HOWEVER,
THAT ALTHOUGH WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MEET SHAH'S
NEEDS AS SHAH SAW THEM, OUR MILITARY ADVISERS, AS GOT
KNEW, WERE CONCERNED THAT ACCELERATION OF AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION
WOULD STRAIN SUPPORT AND OPERATIONAL MANPOWER OF ITAF AND COULD
LEAD TO DECREASE RATHER THAN INCREASE IN ITAF EFFECTIVENESS.
AZIMI REPLIED THAT NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT TO BE DELIVERED HAD BEEN
CLOSELY STUDIED BY ITAF WITH MAAG ASSISTANCE, AND ITAF WAS SATISFIED THAT SIXTEEN AIRCRAFT REQUESTED COULD BE EFFECTIVELY INTEGRATED INTO, PRESENT FORCE STRUCTURE. AZIMI CLOSED MEETING BY
ASKING THAT USG ANSWER SHAH'S REQUEST AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

6. COMMENT. SHAH IS DEEPLY CONCERNED AT DEVELOPMENTS OVER PAST YEARS STRENGTHENING SOVIET INFLUENCE AND PRESENCE IN MIDEAST AND INDIAN OCEAN AND APPEARING TO INDIQUE SUBSTANTIALLY ENLARGED SOVIET COMMITMENT, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY, TO IRAG. HE HAS CONCLUDED THAT INCREASED PRESENT DANGER REQUIRESTRAN'S FIRST LINE AIR DEFENSE TO BE BESFED-UP NOW RATHER THAN IN PREVIOUSLY PROGRAMMED SCHEDULE STARTING IN EIGHTEEN MONTHS. THE NUMBER, FREQUENCY AND TONE OF DEMARCHES ON SUBJECT WE HAVE RECEIVED IS VIRTUALLY UNPARALLELLED, AND CAN LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT HIM CONSIDERS ISSUE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE.

7. WHETHER WE FULLY AGREE WITH SHAHIS CONCERN, WE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT REQUEST --LIKE USG DECISION IN 1970 ON SALE TO IRAN OF SEVENTH AND BIGHTH SQUADRONS OF F-4EL -- HAS BECOME ANOTHER GUT ISSUE IN SHAH'S MIND. SHAH IS AGAIN TURNING TO





#### Department of State

# **TELEGRAM**

PAGE 04 TEHRAN 01164 251020Z

USG BECAUSE IN PERIOD OF ANXIETY SHAH FEELS HE CAN LOOK TO US FOR COOPERATION AND HE HOPES THAT US AS RELIABLE FRIEND WILL FIND CHANCE

BE RESPONSIVE ON MATTER HE CONSIDERS IMPORTANT
AND VITAL TO IRAN'S SECURITY. THUS USB CONSIDERATION OF REQUEST
MUST RECOGNIZE THAT DECISION INVOLVES UNUSUAL DEGREE OF POLITICAL IMPORTANCE RELATED TO FABRIC OF USB-BOI RELATIONS. DECISION
SHOULD ALSO NOT OVERLOOK OR UNDERESTIMATE IMPORTANCE OF IRAN
FOR VITAL US NATIONAL INTERESTS.

ACTION REQUESTED. COUNTY TEAM URGES THAT USG GIVE PROMPT AND SYMPATHETIC ATTENTION TO SHAHIS REQUEST FOR 1972 DELIVERY OF F-AE AIRCRAFTA FROM WHATEVER SOURCES MAY BE AVAILABLE TO BE TAPPED LINCLUDING DELIVERIES TO USAFI. WE RECOGNIZE THAT REQUEST MAY RAISE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS, BUT URBE THAT EVERY AVENUE BE EXPLORED TO REACH POSITIVE RESPONSE. IT IS ALSO MOST IMPORM TANT THAT COUNTRY TEAM BE KEPT FULLY INFORMED OF BROGRESS AND PROSPECTS TO ENABLE US CONTINUE TO MEET AND TEMPER SENSE OF URGENCY ON SUBJECT WHICH PREVAILS WITHIN GOIS IF DELAYS OR BARRIERS TO FULLY FAVORABLE RESPONSE MATERIALIZED WE TRUST THAT EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO BE AS FORTHEOMING AS POSSIBLE LE.G. PARTIAL DELIVERY IN 1972) AND THAT PERSUASIVE MATIONALE. CAN BE DEVELOPED TO FULLY EXPLAIN TO SHAH REASONS FOR ANY SHORTCOMING, IN ORDER TO DIMINIBH AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE NEGATIVE: IMPACT . GP=3 HECK